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Abstract
When individuals choose from whatever alternatives available to them the one that maximizes
their utility then it is always desirable that the government provide them with as many
alternatives as possible. Individuals, however, do not always choose what is best for them and
their mistakes may be exacerbated by the availability of options. We analyze self-selection
models, when individuals know more about themselves than it is possible for governments to
know, and show that it may be socially optimal to limit and sometimes to eliminate individual
choice. As an example, we apply Luce’s (1959) model of random choice to a work-retirement
decision model and show that the optimal provision of choice is positively related to the
degree of heterogeneity in the population and that even with very small degrees of non-
rationality it may be optimal not to provide individuals any choice.
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Providing choice to individuals is beneﬁcial because it can satisfy peo-
ple’s varied tastes. Often, however, expanded choices lead to decision errors.
Psychological studies of decision-making suggest that these errors and other
costs associated with the choice process1 can be signiﬁcant and sometime
outweigh the beneﬁts conferred by a larger set of alternatives. This happens
particularly in areas where decision makers lack expertise and their evaluation
requires complex calculations. Old-age pension programs is a relevant exam-
ple. Savings for consumption during retirement involves many interrelated
uncertainties. Long-ranged discounting and annuitization depend critically
on personally uncertain attributes such as health, mortality rates and future
earnings, as well as macro variables such as interest rates. It is diﬃcult to
evaluate these uncertainties early in life as they unfold long after decisions
are made.
Insurance policies oﬀered by government cannot be based on individual
characteristics because individuals do not willingly reveal their full character-
istics. The government can reasonably know the distribution of characteristics
within the population and will devise its policy to best ﬁt this distribution,
taking into account individuals’ self-selection among alternative programs
available to all. This ‘Second-Best’ social optimum typically provides for a
range of choice to individuals. It is interesting to inquire whether relaxing
the assumption of fully rational choice by individuals due to reasons such as
those discussed above, removes or limits the presumption that provision of
choice is socially desirable. This question was ﬁrst raised by Mirrlees (1987),
who provided some insightful examples of non-rationality leading to socially
optimal policy which leaves no choice to individuals.
1Lowenstein (2000) identiﬁes three types of costs associated with the evaluation of
alternatives: the opportunity costs of the time it takes; the tendency to make errors
under decision ‘overload’ and the psychic costs of anxiety and regret. He cites a number
of studies showing that when decisions become complex, people tend to procrastinate and
to revert to simple but sub-optimal decision rules, such as choosing the ‘default’ alternative.
2Luce (1959) proposed a model of ‘bounded-rationality’ in which individ-
uals attempt to maximize utility but make errors in the decision process.
T h e s ee r r o r sl e a dt or a n d o md e v i a t i o n so ft h ec h o s e na l t e r n a t i v ef r o mt h e
best, reﬂecting utility maximization imperfectly. This is the well-known Logit
model.O n em e r i to ft h em o d e li st h a ti ta l l o w sac o n v e n i e n tm e a s u r eo ft h e
degree of non-rationality, which is the focus of our analysis.
In this paper we apply Luce’s model to a situation in which individ-
uals have to choose between work and no-work (retirement). When oﬀered
consumption levels for workers and non-workers, individuals with varying de-
gree of labor disutility probabilistically self-select themselves between work
and non-work. The government’s objective is to choose consumption levels
that maximize a utilitarian social welfare function subject to a resource con-
straint. The optimal policy depends on individuals’ degree of non-rationality.
When fully rational, it is always optimal to oﬀer them choice. However, we
demonstrate that with some degree of non-rationality, the elimination of the
retirement (or work) option may be socially optimal. Calculations based on
standard functional forms demonstrate that this elimination of choice be-
comes optimal at surprisingly low levels of non-rationality.
The government is assumed to pursue a socially optimal policy. With less
than rational behavior by the government, it may be desirable to design a
constitution which limits the choices available to such government. This, in
turn, may further restrict the provision of choice to individuals. We plan to
study this question in a subsequent paper.
In the context of the current debate about reforming social security with
provision of more choice to individuals, our calculations suggest that beneﬁt-
cost assessments of alternative reforms should incorporate a careful analysis
of individuals’ potential errors and misperceptions.
32 The Luce Model2
Consider an individual who has to choose one among a set of mutually
exclusive alternatives. Neoclassical economic theory assumes that the indi-
vidual has a utility function that allows him or her to rank these alternatives,
choosing the highest ranked. Psychologists (e.g. Luce (1959), Tversky (1969)
and (1972)) criticized this deterministic approach, arguing that the outcome
should be viewed as a probabilistic process. Their approach is to view utility
as deterministic but the choice process to be probabilistic. The individual
does not necessarily choose the alternative that yields the highest utility and
instead has a probability of choosing each of the various possible alternatives.
Am o d e lo f‘ bounded rationality’ along these lines has been proposed by
Luce (1959). Luce shows that when choice probabilities satisfy a certain
axiom (the ‘choice axiom’), a scale, termed ‘utility’, can be deﬁned over
alternatives such that the choice probabilities can be derived from the scales
(‘utilities’) of the alternatives.
Consider a set S of a ﬁnite number, n, of discrete alternatives, ai,i=
1, 2..., n. Luce’s (Multinomial) Logit Model postulates that the probability






,i =1 , 2..., n (1)
where ui = u(ai) for some real-valued utility function u,a n dq is a positive
constant representing the ’precision’ of choice. When q =0 , all alternatives
2For a comprehensive discussion of discrete choice theory see Anderson, de-Palma and
Thisse (1992).
4have an equal probability to be chosen: pi = 1
n for all i =1 , 2..., n.A s q
increases to +∞, pi increases monotonically, approaching 1, when ui is the
largest among all uj, j =1 , 2,..., n, and decreases monotonically, approach-
ing 0, otherwise. Thus, it is natural to call the parameter q the ’degree of
rationality’ (with q = ∞ called ’perfect rationality’).3
3Debreu (1990) has pointed out a weakness in Luce’s model. The introduction of
a new alternative “more than proportionately reduces the choice probabilities of existing
alternatives that are similar, while causing less than proportionate reductions in the choice
probabilities of dissimilar alternatives” (Anderson, et-al (1992)). This is the well-known
“blue bus/red bus” paradox. This objection, can be pertinent in imperfectly competitive
market circumstances, when ﬁrms may take advantage of this implication. In the social
welfare context, on the other hand, the government may take advantage of this property
in providing weight to socially desirable ’default’ alternatives. Generally, Luce’s model has
considerable merit as it incorporates a tendency to utility maximization and the parameter
q provides a convenient measure of the degree of rationality.
53S o c i a l W e l f a r e A n a l y s i s
Suppose that the population consists of heterogeneous individuals, each
characterized by a parameter θ. Individual θ’s utility of alternative i is
ui(θ)=u(ai, θ), with the corresponding choice probabilities pi(θ) given by
(1), i =1 , 2,..., n. We postulate (Mirrlees (1987)) that individuals’ welfare





















where F(θ) is the distribution function of θ in the population. The gov-
ernment’s objective is to choose policies that maximize W subject to relevant
resource constraints and taking into account individual reactions to alterna-
tive policies. We begin by assuming that individuals are passive, i.e. they
only choose alternatives probabilistically as described above and there are no
resource constraints5.
4It is interesting to analyze the case of diﬀerent group levels of q. Individual ’awareness’
of their own and of others’ levels of q and the corresponding market interactions and
strategies become then crucial issues.
5It is easy to incorporate resource constraints when they are at the individual level.
Thus, suppose that when choosing alternative i, individual θ’s utility is ui(xi,y ,θ),w h e r e
xi is an attribute of alternative i to be chosen by the individual and y is the quantity of
a numeraire good. With given income R(θ) and a private cost ci(xi, θ) of alternative i,
y = R(θ)−ci(xi, θ)( ≥ 0). The utility ui(θ) in the text can be interpreted as the optimized
utility (w.r.t.xi) which incorporates the resource constraint. See below on the case when
there is an aggregate resource constraint (and hence subject to government policy).
6Let V (θ) be the utility of individual θ when choosing the best alternative:
V (θ)=argmax[u1(θ),u 2(θ),..., un(θ)] (4)
The corresponding level of social welfare when each individual chooses










Proposition 1. (I) If all alternatives do not yield the same utility for all
individuals, then W(q) strictly increases in q;( I I )W(∞) = lim
q→∞W(q)=W


















which, under the assumption, proves (I). Statements (II) and (III) also
follow directly from the deﬁnitions (1), (2) and (3) ¥.
7Under ’perfect-rationality’, q = ∞, each individual makes the ’right
choice’, and hence there is no reason, from a social welfare point of view,
to limit the choice set. By continuity, this conclusion applies to large levels
of q. When individuals make small errors, the full set of alternatives can best
accommodate the diversity of individual preferences represented by θ.A tt h e
other extreme, when all alternatives have equal probabilities to be chosen by
all individuals, q =0 , a large set of alternatives exacerbates (’spreads’) the
errors that individuals make to an extent that clearly outweighs the bene-
ﬁts of diversity. It is then socially optimal to drastically reduce the set of
alternatives to a singleton, i.e. not to provide individuals any choice. This
single socially preferred alternative depends, of course, on the distribution of
population characteristics, accommodating as large as possible a mass con-
centration of individuals. The proof of this statement is straightforwards.
Let
Wm ⊆ argmax(W1,W 2,..., Wn) (8)
In case of ties, the following applies to any element in the set (8).
We now have:
Proposition 2. If Wi,i =1 , 2,..., n are not all equal, then when q =0
social welfare is maximized by oﬀering only alternative m.





Wi and from (8)
¥.
Since W(q) is continuous in q, the implication of Proposition 2 is that
there exists a positive level of q,s a yq0, such that for all q ≤ q0, restricting the
choice set confronting individuals to alternative m alone is socially desirable.
As q increases above q0, it is desirable to expand the set of alternatives,
eventually including all of them for large q. It is interesting to inquire whether
8this ’expansion process’ is gradual, i.e. whether it is optimal to include one
or more alternatives simultaneously as q increases from q0
6.
It can be shown that all these cases are possible. Here we shall focus
only on q0, characterizing the extent of errors that warrant the elimination
of individual choice.
6L e tTb eas u b s e to f{1,2,,n}, standing for the indices of the alternatives oﬀered
to individuals. Consider the addition of alternative s, not included in T.D e n o t e b y
T0 = sUT,a n dl e tWT and WT0 be the corresponding levels of social welfare when the





s (θ)(us(θ) − V T(θ)dF(θ)),w h e r epT 0
s (θ) is the probability that indi-
vidual θ chooses alternative s when confronting the set T0 and V T(θ) is expected utility of
individual θ when confronting the set T. A necessary and suﬃcient condition for s to be
included in the socially optimal set for some q is that, for some subset T, us(θ)−V T(θ) > 0
in an interval of θ with a positive density. Suﬃciency follows from the fact that as q in-
creases, pT 0
s (θ) approaches zero for those θ for which us(θ)−V T(θ) < 0 and approaches 1
on the complementary set of θ.
Starting with a single alternative at q = q0, one can formulate an algorithm for inclusion
of additional alternatives as q increases, so that welfare strictly increases with q at every
step. It is easy to see that a discrete increase of ∆q>0 in q may lead to an inclusion of
more than one additional alternative.
94 Self-Selection and Aggregate Constraints
The model outlined above has the property that, under perfect rationality
(q = ∞), the economy attains the First-Best allocation of resources when
individuals are oﬀered the complete set of alternatives. At the other ex-
treme, we concluded that when individual choice probabilities are uniformly
distributed (q =0 ) , it is socially optimal to eliminate individual choice.
B o t hc o n c l u s i o n sh a v et ob em o d i ﬁed when the model incorporates private
information not available to the government whose policies aﬀect individual
choice. The argument, however, that it is socially advantageous to reduce
the choice set confronting individuals as they make increasing errors is still
valid.
Suppose that the individual characteristic θ is private information, the
government having only information on the distribution F(θ).G o v e r n m e n t
policies aﬀecting individual utilities and choice probabilities cannot therefore
depend on θ. It is well-known that in these circumstances, even when indi-
viduals are perfectly rational, optimal policies lead to a Second-Best (’Self-
Selection’) equilibrium. When individuals are boundedly rational, the so-
cially optimal policies have to take into account their eﬀect on the choice
probabilities. This leads, in particular, to a modiﬁcation of the conclusion
that when probabilities are uniformly distributed (q =0 )it is always opti-
mal to eliminate individual choice. This stark result may still be optimal,
but other optimal conﬁgurations are possible. The reason is that, under an
aggregate resource constraint, the government’s optimal policies are diﬀerent
when a single alternative is oﬀered than when a number of alternatives are
permitted.
Let ui = ui(xi, θ), i =1 , 2,..., n, be individual θ’s utility of alternative i,
where xi is some government policy (independent of θ). Choice probabilities,
pi = pi(xi, θ), and expected utility
n P
i=1
pi(xi, θ)ui(xi, θ) all depend on xi.
The government’s objective is to choose (x1,x 2,..., xn) that maximize social







where ci(xi) i st h ec o s to fxi in terms of the given level of the aggregate
resource, R. Denote the policies that maximize W subject to the resource
constraint (9) by b xi(q), i =1 , 2,..., n, and the corresponding level of social





pi(b xi(q), θ)ui(b xi(q), θ)
#
(10)
A full-information policy would make xi depend on θ and hence c W(∞)
is a Second-Best equilibrium.







where Wi(b xi(0)) =
R
ui(b xi(0), θ)dF(θ),a n db xi(0) is the limit of b xi(q) as
q → 0.
Let e xm be the feasible policy when only alternative m is permitted. By
(9), it is the solution to cm(e xm)=R. The corresponding social welfare
is f Wm =
R
um(e xm)dF(θ). I ti ss e e nt h a te v e ni fWm(b x(0)) = argmax
[W1(b x1(0)),W 2(b x2(0)),...,Wn(b xn(0))], it does not follow necessarily that f Wm >
c W(0)7. Eliminating choice at q ≤ q0 is now only one of a number of possible
outcomes.
Rather than develop suﬃc i e n tc o n d i t i o n sf o rt h es i n g l eo u t c o m e ,w et u r n
to a detailed example that incorporates the above considerations.
7Or that any other single alternative yield higher welfare than c W(0).
115 A Work-Retirement Model
Individuals can choose whether to work or retire. We take work to be a
0−1 variable and do not model varying hours or work intensity. All workers
are assumed to have the same (non-negative, increasing and concave) utility
of consumption, u(c), while all non-workers have (non-negative, increasing
and concave) utility of consumption, v(c)8. Disutility of work, denoted θ,
is assumed to be additively separable from consumption, so the utility of a
worker with labor disutility level θ is written u(ca) − θ. The distribution of
disutilities plays a central role in determining the willingness to work.
We consider two diﬀerent consumption levels: ca for active workers and cb
for non-workers (”retirement beneﬁts”). We assume that θ is distributed in
the population with distribution F(θ) (and density f(θ)). For convenience,
we assume that f(θ) is continuous and positive for all non-negative values
of θ. Having individuals with a very large labor disutility implies, of course,
that some will choose not to work.
Each worker is assumed to produce one unit of output. Thus, if all in-








where R is the level of outside resources available to the economy. It is as-
sumed, of course, that R>−1 to enable positive consumption.
5.1 First-Best (Labor Disutility Observable)
To set the stage for the optimal policy when labor disutility is not ob-
servable, it may be useful to analyze ﬁrst the full optimum where disutility
is observable.
8We also assume that both u0 and v0 go from +∞ to c as c increases from 0 to +∞.









subject to the resource constraint (12). Optimal consumption, c∗
a and c∗
b,i s









All individuals with disutility below a cutoﬀ,d e n o t e dθ
∗, should work. The




b) with the value of extra net consumption as a consequence of work,
which is the sum of the marginal product and the change in consumption














Whether the solution is interior, θ
∗ > 0, depends on the wealth of the
economy, i.e. the size of R. If no one works, optimal consumption is c∗
b = R.
This allocation is not optimal if those with no labor disutility9, when put
to work for additional consumption equal to their marginal product, enjoy a
higher utility
u(R +1 )>v (R) (16)
9This assumes that f(θ) > 0 at θ =0 . Otherwise, a condition similar to (16) below
has to be assumed with respect to those with the least (positive) labor disutility for which
f(θ) > 0.
13We assume that (16), which Diamond and Sheshinski (1995) call the
‘poverty condition’, is satisﬁed. This condition ensures that there is some
work at the optimal allocation10. It can also be seen that it is always optimal
for some individuals not to work11.
5.2 Labor Disutility Unobserved
Assume now that individuals choose whether they prefer working to
receiving retirement beneﬁts, or vice-versa. Those with disutilities of labor
below a threshold value which equates utilities of workers and non-workers
will choose to work. The threshold value, b θ,s a t i s ﬁes
b θ = Max[0,u(ca) − v(cb)]. (17)
The government’s problem is now restated as selection of ca and cb so as to
maximize (13) subject to (12), with θ0 not an independent choice parameter
but replaced by b θ, (17), which is a function of ca and cb.
Using the Lagrange multiplier λ and assuming an interior solution, we





dF(θ)=λ(ca − 1 − cb)f(b θ) db θ
dca





dF(θ)=λ(ca − 1 − cb)f(b θ) db θ
dcb
= −λ(ca − 1 − cb)f(b θ)v0(cb)
(19)
10By (12), when θ
∗ =0 , c∗
b = R.S e t t i n g c∗
a = R +1 , condition (16) implies that the
L.H.S. of (15) is larger than the R.H.S. (= 0).
11If there are no non-workers then c∗
b =0and c∗
a = R +1 . It follows from (15) that the
utility of the marginal worker is negative. Since v(0) = 0, this cannot be an equilibrium.
14w h e r ew eh a v eu s e d( 1 7 )t oo b t a i nt h ed e r i v a t i v e so fb θ. The L.H.S. of (18)
and (19) are the net social values of giving consumption to workers and non-
workers, respectively, rather than holding the resources. The R.H.S. are the
social values of the resource savings from the induced changes in labor supply
as a result of changes in ca and cb, respectively. The private return to work
is ca − cb and hence, since the marginal product is one, 1 − ca + cb > 0 is an
implicit tax on work.
Denote by (b ca,b cb) optimal consumption which solves (18) and (19) and
denote by b λ the corresponding optimal Lagrangean. Dividing (18) by u0(b ca)













That is, the inverse of the Lagrangian is a weighted average of the inverse of
the marginal utilities at the optimum, u0(b ca) and v0(b cb).
We shall now impose a condition that will imply that, at the optimum,
the marginal utility of consumption of non-workers exceeds that of workers.
This is the Diamond-Mirrlees (1978) moral-hazard condition,t h a te q u a t i n g
utilities between non-workers and workers who dislike work the least leaves
marginal utility higher for non-workers:
u(x)=v(y) implies u
0(x) <v
0(y).( 2 1 )
Since b θ > 0, (17) implies that u(b ca) >v (b cb).H e n c e , b y( 2 1 ) ,u0(b ca) <v 0(b cb).
By (20) then, u0(b ca) < λ <v 0(b cb), and it follows from (18)-(19) that 1−b ca +
b cb > 0, i.e. at the optimum there is a positive implicit tax on work.
156 Logit Model of Randomness in Individual
Decisions
Instead of the previous deterministic model of individual choice, sup-
pose now that an individual with labor disutility θ chooses to work with
probability pa,w h e r e
pa = pa(ca,c b,q,θ)=
eq(u(ca)−θ)
eq(u(ca)−θ) + eqv(cb), (22)
This is a special case of the logit model presented in Sections 2 and 3.
It is seen that as q, the degree of accuracy (‘rationality’), increases from 0
to +∞, pa increases (decreases) from pa = 1
2 for all θ to pa =1 ( =0 )for
θ < (>)b θ = u(ca) − v(cb) > 012. Figure 1 depicts pa as a function of θ.
The sum of the probabilities of all individuals who should work, that is
those with θ < b θ = u(ca) − v(cb), relative to this sum under full rationality
(= b θ), can be viewed as an indicator for the eﬀects of ‘bounded-rationality’.
Appendix A provides some calculations for representative values of ca, cb
and alternative values of q.F o rt h ec a s eu(c)=v(c)=l nc,t h i sp r o p o r t i o n
depends on the ratio cb/ca.W i t hcb/ca = .5, it increases from .5 to .97 as q
increases from 0 to 30. With cb/ca = .7 it reaches .94 and with cb/ca = .9 it
reaches only .79, at q =3 0 .T h u s ,ah i g h e rcb/ca has a signiﬁcantly negative
eﬀect on this proportion.
With choice of work and retirement governed by the probabilities pa,




[(u(ca) − θ)pa + v(cb)(1 − pa)]dF(θ). (23)
12When u(ca) − v(cb) < 0, pa decreases to 0 for all θ as q approaches +∞.
16Accordingly, the resource constraint is given by
∞ Z
0
[(ca − 1)pa + cb(1 − pa)]dF(θ)=R. (24)
Maximization of (23) with respect to ca and cb subject to (24), taking
into account the dependence of pa on these variables, (22), yields, in addition

































where we used that
∂pa
∂ca = qpa(1 − pa)u0(ca) and
∂pa
∂cb = qpa(1 − pa)v0(cb).
The interpretation of these conditions is basically unchanged: the L.H.S.
of (25) and (26) is the expected net value of additional consumption to work-
ers and non-workers, respectively. The R.H.S. is expected next resource cost
of this additional consumption, which now includes the eﬀect on all ‘intra-
marginal’ net utilities (i.e. those for which u(ca) − θ − v(cb) is positive or
17negative) of a change in the probability of work as a result of the change in
consumption.
Denote the optimal consumption levels which solve (24), (25) and (26)
by (b ca(q),b cb(q)). These levels imply, in turn, an optimal probability b pa =
b pa(q,θ)=b pa(b ca,b cb,q,θ) for an individual with labor disutility θ to choose to
work. The corresponding optimal level of social welfare, denoted c W(q),i s
given by (23): c W(q)=
∞ R
0
[(u(b ca) − θ)b pa + v(b cb)(1 − b pa)]dF(θ).
We shall be interested in the dependence of these optimal values on the
degree of rationality, q.
As q goes to +∞, b pa approaches 1 or 0 depending on whether θ is below
or above b θ,( 1 7 ) ,w h i l eqb pa(1 − b pa)dF(θ) approaches f(b θ)dθ for θ = b θ and
0 elsewhere. Thus, (25)-(26) are a generalization of (18)-(19), converging to
the latter as q goes to +∞.
Dividing (25) and (26) by u0(b ca) and v0(b cb), respectively, and adding these












(1 − b pa)dF(θ) (27)
As before, the inverse of the optimal Lagrangean is a weighted average of
the inverse of the marginal utilities.
187 Dependence of the Optimum on the Degree
of Rationality
When individuals have a choice between work and retirement, the op-
timal level of social welfare, c W(q), increases with the degree of rationality,
dc W
dq > 0,p r o v i d e dw ea s s u m et h a t ,f o ra l lq, there is an implicit optimal tax
on work: 1−b ca +b cb > 0 (Appendix B). At one extreme, when individual de-
cisions are fully rational and deterministic, q =+ ∞,i ti sa l w a y so p t i m a lf o r
some individuals with low labor disutility to work (the ‘poverty condition’,
(16)) and for some with large labor disutility to retire (we have assumed
that f(θ) > 0 for all positive θ). At the other end, when q =0 , individuals’
choice between work and retirement is independent of the levels of ca and cb,
being pa = 1
2 for all θ. That is, half of all individuals choose not to work,
including those with very low labor disutility. It seems possible, therefore,
that with relatively low q, the elimination of the retirement option altogether
may dominate all feasible positive combinations of ca and cb. Similarly, since
half of all individuals choose to work, including those with very high labor
disutility, it seems possible that the elimination of the work option may also
dominate all feasible positive combinations of ca and cb.
We want to demonstrate that these are valid possibilities:
Proposition 3. When q =0the optimal allocation has one of the fol-
lowing forms: (a) consumption levels of workers and of non-workers equate
their marginal utilities, u0(b ca)=v0(b cb),a n db ca + b cb =2 R +1 ;o r( b )t h e
retirement option is eliminated, setting b ca = R+1; or (c) the work option is
eliminated, setting b cb = R.
Inspection of (23) and (24) shows that in the presence of work and retire-
ment options, when q =0and pa = 1
2 for all ca, cb and θ, W is maximized
when
19u
0(b ca(0)) = v
0(b cb(0)) where b ca(0) + b cb(0) = 2R +1 (28)











θdF(θ) is expected (‘average’) labor disutility.
Without a retirement option, b ca = R +1and the corresponding level of
welfare, denoted Wa,i s
Wa = u(R +1 )− E(θ) (30)
Without a work option, b cb = R and the corresponding level of welfare,
denoted Wb,i s
Wb = v(R) (31)
We want to show that each of (29), (30) or (31) is a possible optimum.
For this purpose, it suﬃces to examine a special case. Thus, assume that
u(c)=v(c). Then, from (28), b ca = b cb = R+ 1
2 and c W(0) = u(R+ 1
2)− 1
2E(θ).
Elimination of the retirement option is optimal iﬀ Wa > c W(0).B y( 2 9 )a n d
(30), the following condition has to hold:














E(θ).( 3 3 )
20By concavity, u(R+1)−u(R+1
2) > 1
2u0(R+1), hence a suﬃcient condition
for (33) is
u
0(R +1 )>E (θ). (34)
By (30) and (31), Wa >W b is equivalent to u(R +1 )− u(R) >E (θ).
Hence, condition (32) is also suﬃcient for no-retirement to dominate the
no-work program.
Similarly, from (29) and (31), Wb > c W(0),i ﬀ















Since u(R + 1
2) − u(R) < 1
2u0(R),asuﬃcient condition for (36) is
u
0(R) <E (θ) (37)
Again, (37) implies that Wb >W a, that is, eliminating the work option
is optimal. Obviously, (34) and (37) are mutually exclusive: either a no-
retirement program or a no-work program are optimal.
Calculations presented in the next section indicate the following solu-
tion pattern. As the degree of rationality, q, decreases, so does the optimal
level of welfare, c W(q). The gap between optimal consumption of workers and
non-workers ﬁrst increases in order to mitigate the rise in the probability of
errors due to lower rationality. However, at still lower levels of q,t h eg a p
between workers’ marginal utility of consumption and that of non-workers
becomes more important than the maintenance of low probabilities of error
and consequently the consumption gap starts to decrease, eventually disap-
pearing (for u(c)=v(c)) when inevitable errors are unaﬀected by policy (at
q =0 ). Figure 2 presents this pattern which assumes that c W(0) >W a >W b:
preserving choice between work and retirement dominates a no-choice policy
21for all values of q. It is possible, however, as argued above, that elimina-
tion of the retirement option is dominant for small or moderate values of q
(Wa > c W(0)). This is depicted in Figure 3. Alternatively, it is possible that
elimination of the work option becomes dominant for small or moderate q.
8 Logarithmic Two-Class Example
C o n s i d e rt h ec a s ew h e r et h e r ea r eo n l yt w ot y p e si nt h ee c o n o m y ,θ1 and
θ2(θ1 < θ2), with population weights f1 and f2 =1− f1. Let workers and
non-workers have the same logarithmic utility function: u(c)=v(c)=l nc.
Hence, workers and non-workers have equal consumption in the First-Best




∗ =l n ( R + f1) − θ1f1. (38)
Social welfare when both types work, Wa,i s
Wa =l n ( R +1 )− θ1f1 − θ2f2 (39)










Social welfare when nobody works, Wb,i s
Wb =l nR (41)
We assumed that no work is inferior to type one working, W∗ >W b (the










22(which is trivially satisﬁed when θ1 =0 13).
Under self-selection, the incentive compatibility condition for type one is
ln(ca) − θ1 ≥ lncb. Since the marginal utility of non-workers is higher than
that of workers, this condition holds with equality:
lnca − θ1 =l ncb or ca = cbe
θ1. (43)
Solving from the resource constraint
















Comparing (46) and (49), the condition that at the self-selection optimum
















Conditions (40) and (47) are the same when θ1 =0 , otherwise (46) is a
somewhat more stringent condition than (40).
In the Logit model of Section 6, when q =0 , half the population works
independent of the levels of consumption oﬀered to workers and non-workers.
Hence, it is optimal to oﬀer both equal consumption: b ca(0) = b cb(0) = R+ 1
2.
As half the population works, social welfare, c W(0), is accordingly






(θ1f1 + θ2f2) (48)
13S e ef o o t n o t e9a b o v e .















For (46) and (49) to be mutually satisﬁed it is required that





θ1f1 + f2) (50)
For example, with θ1 =0 , condition (48) is (R+1)f1 > 1
4. This can clearly
be satisﬁed. Thus, it is possible that a retirement alternative is desirable
when individuals select their best alternative with certainty, but it is socially
optimal to eliminate this alternative when individuals are less than perfectly
rational.
Since c W(q) increases in q14, whenever Wa > c W(0) there exists a ‘cutoﬀ’
q such that c W(q) is larger (smaller) than Wa for q larger (smaller) than this
value. It is interesting to examine at what level of q and the corresponding
optimal solutions this cutoﬀ occurs.
Optimal q
Values
01 2 4 7 1 0 2 0 1 0 0 ∞
b ca .50 .80 .88 .71 .62 .60 .57 .52 .50
b cb .50 .32 .33 .32 .36 .38 .43 .48 .50
b p
1
a .50 .71 .88 .96 .98 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
b p
2
a . 5 0 . 3 6 . 2 6 . 0 6 . 0 1 0000
W -1.07 -.99 -.88 -.80 -.75 -.72 -.71 -.69 -.69
Wa -.75 -.75 -.75 -.75 -.75 -.75 -.75 -.75 -.75
Table 1a: R =0 , θ1 =0 , θ2 =1 .5,f 1 = .5
14as u ﬃcient condition is a positive tax on work (see Appendix B).
24Optimal q
Values
012461 0 2 0 1 0 0 ∞
b ca .5 .97 1.00 1.00 .95 .87 .80 .71 .67
b cb .5 .37 .43 .47 .50 .55 .60 .65 .67
b p
1
a .5 .72 .84 .95 .98 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
b p
2
a . 5 . 3 7 . 2 1 . 0 5 . 0 1 0000
b W -.94 -.80 -.65 -.52 -.50 -.44 -.42 -.41 -.41
Wa -.50 -.50 -.50 -.50 -.50 -.50 -.50 -.50 -.50
Table 2a: R =0 , θ1 =0 , θ2 =1 .5,f 1 = .67
Optimal q
Values
0 1 1.5 2 10 20 40 100 ∞
b ca .5 .67 .71 .70 .60 .57 .54 .52 .50
b cb .5 .27 .27 .27 .38 .43 .46 .48 .50
b p
1
a .5 .71 .81 .87 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
b p
2
a . 5 . 2 5 . 1 8 . 1 1 00000
b W -1.19 -1.08 -1.00 -.93 -.73 -.71 -.70 -.69 -.69
Wa -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00
Table 3a: R =0 , θ1 =0 , θ2 =2 ,f 1 = .5
Optimal q
Values
0 1 2 4 10 20 40 100 ∞
b ca .5 .85 .98 .97 .86 .80 .74 .71 .67
b cb .5 .34 .38 .45 .55 .60 .63 .65 .67
b p
1
a .5 .71 .87 .96 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
b p
2
a . 5 . 2 5 . 1 1 . 0 1 00000
b W -1.03 -.85 -.67 -.52 -.44 -.42 -.41 -.41 -.41
Wa -.67 -.67 -.67 -.67 -.67 -.67 -.67 -.67 -.67
Table 4a: R =0 , θ1 =0 , θ2 =2 ,f 1 = .5







eqθi,i=1 ,2 and Wa =
−θ2f2 = −θ2(1 − f1).
Tables 1-4 present calculations of the optimal values b ca,b cb, b pi
a = b pa(b ca,b cb,q,θi),
i =1 ,2,a n dc W(q) for given parameters (R,θ1,θ2,f 1) and alternative values
of q15. The parameters R and θ1 are ﬁxed at R = θ1 =0 , while θ2 and f1
are varied to examine their eﬀect on the optimal solution. With R =0 ,a
no-work program without choice cannot be a possible optimum.
With these parameter values, (48) becomes c W(0) = −ln2 − 1
2θ2f2.B y
(46), c W(∞)=l n f1 and, by (39), Wa = −θ2f2. Thus, a unique cutoﬀ
between Wa and c W(q) occurs at a positive q iﬀ θ2 < 2
f2 ln2. The parameters
in Tables 1-4 satisfy this condition.
In Tables 1 and 2 the cutoﬀ occurs at q equal to 7 and 6, respectively.
At these cutoﬀ levels of q, the corresponding optimal ratios of non-worker
to workers consumption, b cb/b ca, are around a half and the probabilities b p1
a
and b p2
a are .98 and .01, respectively. The implication is that elimination of
the retirement alternative is optimal when 98 percent or less of type 1 and 1
p e r c e n to rm o r eo ft y p e2i n d i v i d u a l sw o r k ,ar a t h e rs u r p r i s i n gr e s u l t .T h e
change in the relative weight of the two types is seen to have only a marginal
eﬀect on the results.
Tables 3-4 take a higher value of type 2 labor disutility. As expected, the
optimal elimination of the retirement option occurs now at lower levels of q,
b e t w e e n1 . 5a n d2( c o m p a r e dt o7a n d6p r e v i o u s l y ) .A tt h e s ec u t o ﬀ levels
of q, the corresponding optimal consumption ratios, b cb/b ca,a r es i g n i ﬁcantly
smaller: around a third. Accordingly, the optimal probabilities b p1
a and b p2
a
at which the ‘cutoﬀ’ occurs are now between .81 and .87 and between .18
and .11, respectively. Thus, elimination of the retirement option is optimal
when around 85 percent or less of type 1 and 11 percent or more of type 2
individuals work. Again, the change in the relative weight of the two types
has only a marginal eﬀect.
15Calculations are based on MATLAB program for constrained maximization.
26Comparing Tables 1-2 on the one hand and Tables 3-4 on the other, it is
seen that, as expected, a larger spread of labor disutility in the population
signiﬁcantly reduces the levels of non-rationality for which it is optimal not
to provide individuals any choice. Clearly, optimal choice provision is highly
sensitive to population heterogeneity.
The most striking and surprising conclusion emerging from these calcula-
tions is the wide range of solutions for which no choice is optimal.E l i m i n a -
tion of the retirement option compels all individuals to work. This includes a
small proportion of individuals who, when having a retirement option, choose
erroneously to retire and a large proportion of individuals with high labor
disutility who choose not to work. This is a large cost which, presumably,
outweighs the former beneﬁt. There is, however, another beneﬁt. The ad-
ditional output produced by the entrants to the labor force enables a large
increase in consumption to everyone. It is this beneﬁt which tilts the out-
come in favor of compulsion at very low levels of non-rationality. It is worth





eq(u(ca)−θ + eqv(cb) =
1
1+aeqθ (1A)
where a = eq[v(cb)−u(ca)]. The proportion of individuals who choose to work















where b θ = u(ca) − v(cb).










.( 2 A ) n o w
becomes,
π =1−
ln2 − ln[1 + (cb/ca)q]
ln(cb/ca)q . (3A)
Assume that cb 6 ca. Using L’Hospital’s rule, π is seen to approach 1 as
q goes to +∞ and to approach 1
2 as q goes to 0. Table 1A presents select
values of π for alternative values of q and cb/ca = .5,. 7a n d. 9 .
In all cases π increases rapidly from .5 when q =0to levels larger than
.0 for values of q over 40. It is also seen that the rate of increase of π













0 .50 .50 .50
1 .58 .54 .51
5 .81 .70 .57
10 .90 .81 .63
15 .93 .87 .68
20 .95 .90 .73
30 .97 .94 .79
40 .98 .95 .84
50 .98 .96 .87
70 .99 .97 .91
100 .99 .98 .93
∞ 1.01 .01 .0
Table A.1
29Appendix B
Given the deﬁnition of pa,( 2 2 ) ,
∂pa
∂ca = qpa(1 − pa)u0(ca),
∂pa
∂ca = −qpa(1 −
pa)v0(cb) and
∂pa
∂q = pa(1−pa)(u(ca)−θ−v(cb)). By (23), totally diﬀerentiating






{[b pa +( u(b ca) − θ − v(b cb))qb pa(1 − b pa)]u0(b ca)db ca
dq +
[(1 − b pa) − (u(b ca) − θ − v(b cb))qb pa(1 − b pa)]v0(b cb)
db cb
dq +
(u(b ca) − θ − v(b cb))2pa(1 − pa)}dF(θ)
(B.1)
Diﬀerentiating totally the resource constraint, (24):
∞ R
0
{[b pa +( b ca − 1 −b cb)qb pa(1 − b pa)u0(b ca)]db ca
dq +






b pa(1 − b pa)(u(b ca) − θ − v(b cb))}dF(θ)
(B.2)






b pa(1 − b pa)(u(b ca) − θ − v(b cb))
[u(b ca) − θ − v(b cb) − b λ(b ca − 1 − b cb)]dF(θ).
(B.3)
By (27), b λ > 0. Thus, at an interior optimum, an implicit positive tax
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